Phi 001 Uc Davis Physical Continuity

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PHI 001: Introduction to Philosophy
UC Davis: Winter 2019
Paper Assignment #1
Papers are due, as hard copies, on Thursday, Feb. 21, at the end of lecture.
NOTE: Please read all the instructions before you begin, and please follow the instructions! Write a
5-page paper (double-spaced, with reasonable margins and font-sizes) in which you 'REC' one
(and only one) of the following arguments, in accordance with the instructions given below:
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument, in sections III and IV of "Turning the Trolley" (posted on
Canvas but not assigned reading), for the conclusion that the bystander in Bystander's Two
Options may not choose option (ii), i.e., may not turn the trolley and kill the one. (This is the paper
in which she changes her mind, after many years, about the Trolley Problem — and gives an
argument to support her new verdict.)
2. Robert Nozick's 'experience machine' argument against hedonism (the text of which appears in
the slides).
3. The argument against the Divine Command Theory presented by Schick and Vaughn (posted
but not assigned).
4. The argument for utilitarianism in the first paragraph of page 147 of Learning from Arguments:
An Introduction to Philosophy by Dan Korman. Available at:
http://www.philosophy.ucsb.edu/faculty/korman/Textbook.pdf
5. An argument of your choice, provided that you write up a very brief proposal, submit the
proposal to your TA by Tuesday, Feb. 12, and receive approval from your TA. (It is entirely up to
your TA to decide whether or not to approve your proposal.) Your proposal should take the
following form:
The argument that I would like to REC is presented in a passage in [name the reading] that
begins with the sentence "[enter first sentence of chosen passage here]" on page [XX] and
ends with the sentence "[enter last sentence of chosen passage here]" on page [YY]. The
conclusion that is argued for in this passage is that [state conclusion here].
You should cut and paste this text into an email that you send to your TA. But don't forget to fill in
the blanks! (In addition to the assigned readings, another good source of arguments to reconstruct
are chapters 1 ("God does not exist"), 2 ("You should bet on God"), 4 ("You know nothing"), 7
("Taxation is immoral"), 8 ("Abortion is immoral"), 9 ("Eating animals is immoral), 10 ("A defense of
utilitarianism") of the Korman book linked to above. Don't choose a passage that has already been
reconstructed in the text.)
(NEW) 6. Jonathan Vogel's argument against what he calls the 'Moorean view', in his paper
'Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation' (posted in the paper topics folder on Canvas,
not assigned). Be sure to explain the Moorean view.
(NEW) 7. Jonathan Vogel's argument for the claim that the real world hypothesis is a better
explanation of your sensory experiences than the isomorphic skeptical hypothesis, in his paper
'Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation' (posted in the paper topics folder, not
assigned). Be sure to say what those hypotheses are.
1
[Note: students are often tempted to criticize arguments for moral conclusions by saying
something along the lines of 'morality is subjective/relative; we all have our own opinions;
there's no real fact of the matter'. This is almost never an effective criticism, and you should
avoid it in this paper.]
REC-ing an argument:
R: Reconstruct. Put the argument into standard form, so that it fits a valid pattern and captures
as much of the author's reasoning as is compatible with its being relatively brief and compact.
So, you should try not to leave out important pieces of reasoning, but you should also avoid
making your reconstruction overly long and complicated. These are competing pressures, so
you just have to strike a good balance. Often, a good reconstruction has only two premises.
Display the pattern that it fits, in symbols, to the right of your reconstruction, in words. Here is an
example:
1. Anything that is maximally great exists in reality. All P1s are P2s
2. God is maximally great.
m is a P1
3. If God exists in reality, then theism is true.
If m is a P2, then A.
— ——
∴ Theism is true.
A
E: Explain. For each premise in your reconstruction, mention it by name (its number) and
devote at least one sentence to explaining why that premise might seem plausible, at least
initially. Also, if there are any unfamiliar terms or phrases in the premise, take this chance to
explain what they mean. If the logical structure of the argument is somewhat complex, you may
wish to explain informally why the intended conclusion really does follow from the given
premises.
C: Criticize. After you've motivated each of the premises, focus on one particular premise,
mention it by name, and attack it: that is, present, in detail, what you take to be the most powerful
reason(s) for thinking that the given premise is not true, or for thinking that the premise is less
plausible than the advocate of the argument took it to be.
If space permits, you may (i) discuss a potential response to your criticism that could be given
by an advocate of the argument, (ii) a reply to that response, (ii) attack another premise in the
argument, (iii) suggest a different argument that is immune to the criticisms you've raised, or
make other relevant and useful philosophical point. But the bulk of your paper should be
structured around RECing an argument. Avoid free-form, stream-of-consciousness
expostulating.
Use the Cederblom and Paulsen text for more detailed guidelines on the DOs and DON'Ts of
reconstructing arguments. Some highlights:
• Be sure that you've correctly identified the main conclusion of the argument in question.
• Be sure that your reconstruction fits a valid pattern.
• Be sure that your reconstruction (in words) really does match the pattern (in symbols) that
you've written out.
• Be sure that none of your arguments contains any idle premises, i.e. premises that are not
needed to make the argument valid. (If a premise is idle in a given argument, then you could
simply delete that premise and the argument would still be valid. Such a premise is doing no
work.)
2
• Be sure that the premise you attack is not just obviously false – a 'sitting duck'. It should have
some appeal; it should be the sort of premise that begins to seem doubtful only after you've
criticized it.
Hard Copy. The paper should be given a title, printed out, and stapled.
Length. Your paper should be 4 to 5 double-spaced pages long (assuming a reasonable type face
and size and reasonable margins), NOT INCLUDING ANY QUOTATIONS OR NUMBERED
RECONSTRUCTIONS. This means the paper should include 4 to 5 pages of ordinary text in
paragraph form written by you. Most of that should be focused on a critical evaluation of an
argument.
Grading. You will be graded on the clarity and mechanics of your writing, on how well your paper
is organized, and most importantly, on how well you've explained and critically evaluated an
argument. Again, the critical component will be weighted the most heavily of the three: the more
original, insightful, and convincing your criticism of a premise, the better your grade will be.
There is no mechanical recipe for coming up with interesting criticisms: it takes a lot of time,
hard thinking, and creative spark.
Some rough guidelines
A range: excellent mechanics, extremely clear and accurate explanation of an argument,
unusually insightful/creative/original/persuasive critical points – these must go beyond anything
that has been said in lecture, discussion section, or the readings, and must be sufficiently
interesting and non-obvious that it would take some hard-thinking to come up with them
B range: good mechanics, very solid explanation of an argument with few or no mistakes of fact
or terminology, critical points that are on-target, relevant, and persuasive – though maybe not
quite so dazzling as what one would find in an 'A range' paper.
C range: some problems with mechanics OR some errors or lack of clarity in explaining an
argument OR an off-target or unconvincing critical evaluation.
D range and below: two or more of the following: serious mechanical problems, major errors or
obscurity in explaining an argument, badly off-target or obviously unconvincing critical
evaluation
Outside Sources and Citations
You are not expected to consult outside sources in writing your paper. You are permitted to this,
of course, but a better way to spend your time is to get clear on what you think about the issues,
and about how to express your own thoughts as clearly and precisely as possible. Any sources
you do consult must be cited at the end of the paper, and any ideas or terminology that you take
from the outside source must be indicated in footnotes. Failure to appropriately cite any outside
sources consulted brings up the issue of . . .
Academic Integrity
I take plagiarism and other violations of the standards of academic integrity very seriously.
Students are responsible for knowing what constitutes inappropriate behavior in this regard;
university policies on the matter can be found in the Code of Academic Conduct file on the
course Canvas page. Any student who violates these standards on an exam or assignment may
be referred to Student Judicial Affairs.
3
JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON
Turning the Trolley
i
The trolley problem is by now thoroughly familiar, but it pays to begin
with a description of its origins.
In "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,"
Philippa Foot described a variety of hypothetical cases, in some of which
we regard it as permissible for the agent to act, in others of which we
regard it as impermissible for the agent to act, and she asked the good
question what explains the differences among our verdicts about them.1
Her aim was to assess whether the Doctrine of Double Effect provides a
plausible answer. She concluded that it doesn't, and went on to offer an
answer of her own. It is her own answer that will interest us.
Here are two of her hypothetical cases. In the first, which I will call
Judge's Two Options, a crime has been committed, and some rioters
have taken five innocent people hostage; they will kill the five unless the
judge arranges for the trial, followed by the execution, of the culprit. The
real culprit is unknown, however. So the judge has only two options:
Judge's Two Options: he can
(i) let the rioters kill the five hostages, or
(ii) frame an innocent person for the crime, and have him
executed.
What follows is a revised version of the keynote address I gave at the USC/UCLA
Philosophy Graduate Student Conference on February 9, 2008. An earlier version was
presented at a conference on issues in philosophy and psychology, held at MIT on May 23,
2007. I am indebted to the participants on both occasions for comments and criticism. I
owe thanks also to the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for helpful suggestions.
1. Foot's article was first published in the Oxford Review in 1967; it is reprinted in her
collection Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).
© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, no. 4
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Philosophy & Public Affairs
Most people would say that the judge must not choose option (ii).
In the second case, which I will call Driver's Two Options, the driver of
a runaway tram has only the following two options:
Driver's Two Options: he can
(i) continue onto the track ahead, on which five men are
working, thereby killing the five, or
(ii) steer onto a spur of track off to the right on which only one
man is working, thereby killing the one.
Most people would say that the driver may choose option (ii).
What explains the difference between our verdicts about what the
agents may do in these two cases? After all, in both cases, the agents must
choose between five deaths and one death.
Foot suggested that the difference is explainable by appeal to two
principles. "There is worked into our moral system a distinction between
what we owe to people in the form of aid and what we owe to them in the
way of non-interference." She suggested that we call what we owe to
people in the form of aid our positive duties, and what we owe to people
in the way of non-interference our negative duties. She then invited us to
accept that negative duties are weightier than positive duties. Markedly
weightier. So much so that, as I will express her first principle:
Letting Five Die Vs. Killing One Principle:
them requires killing B.
A must let five die if saving
That explains why the judge must not choose option (ii).
Things are otherwise in Driver's Two Options. The driver doesn't face
a choice between letting five die and killing one, so the first principle is
irrelevant to his case. So Foot appealed to a second principle, namely
Killing Five Vs. Killing One Principle:
instead kill one.
A must not kill five if he can
Given this principle, the driver must choose option (ii), and, a fortiori, he
may choose it. So that explains why the driver may choose option (ii). So
we now have an explanation of the difference between our verdicts in
the two cases.
Her proposal is very attractive. The ideas about negative and positive
duties expressed in the two principles are not new, but they are intuitively very plausible, and Foot shows that given those two principles, we
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Turning the Trolley
have a satisfying explanation of the differences among our verdicts in all
of the cases she drew attention to. I should perhaps add that the principles she appeals to are intended merely as ceteris paribus principles,
since further information about the six potential victims might make a
difference in our views about what the agent may do. For example,
finding out that one or more of the six potential victims is at fault for the
coming about of the situation they now face might well make such a
difference. What she had in mind is just that other things being equal the
agent must or must not choose such and such an option. It will perhaps
be useful, however, if I make explicit the assumption I make throughout
that no one of the six in any of the cases we consider is at fault.
But are those two principles true? A doubt might be raised about the
second principle.2 I will ignore it, however. I will assume that the second
principle is satisfactory, and focus instead on a doubt that was in fact
raised about the first.
In an article provoked by Foot's, I suggested that we should take our
eyes off the driver; we should eliminate him.3 (Make him have dropped
dead of a heart attack.) Then let us imagine the situation to be as in the
case I will call Bystander's Two Options. A bystander happens to be
standing by the track, next to a switch that can be used to turn the tram
off the straight track, on which five men are working, onto a spur of track
to the right on which only one man is working. The bystander therefore
has only two options:
Bystander's Two Options: he can
(i) do nothing, letting five die, or
(ii) throw the switch to the right, killing one.
Most people say that he may choose option (ii).
If the bystander may choose option (ii) in Bystander's Two Options,
however, then Foot's first principle won't do. For if the Letting Five Die
2. Modeled on John Taurek's doubt about the moral relevance of the numbers in cases
where what is in question is distributing a benefit.
3. "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem," The Monist 59 (1976): 204–17. In that
article, the driver was eliminated in favor of a passenger. The case I will call Bystander's
Two Options—in which the driver is eliminated in favor of a bystander—comes from my
second article provoked by Foot's, namely "The Trolley Problem," The Yale Law Journal 94
(1985): 1395–415. Those two articles, along with Foot's and several others on the topic, were
helpfully reprinted and discussed, Ethics: Problems and Principles, ed. John Martin Fischer
and Mark Ravizza (Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992).
362
Philosophy & Public Affairs
Vs. Killing One Principle is true, then the bystander must not choose
option (ii)—for if he chooses option (ii), he kills one, whereas if he
chooses option (i), he merely lets five die.
But if the Letting Five Die Vs. Killing One Principle is not true, then it
cannot be appealed to to explain why the judge must not choose option
(ii) in Judge's Two Options.
Perhaps there is some other answer to the question why the judge
must not choose option (ii) in Judge's Two Options? An answer resting
on the role of a judge in a legal system? No doubt there is. So let us bypass
that case. Consider a case I called Fat Man. In this case a fat man and I
happen to be on a footbridge over the track. I have two options:
Fat Man: I can
(i) do nothing, letting five die, or
(ii) shove the fat man off the footbridge down onto the track,
thereby killing him, but also, since he's very big, stopping the
tram and saving the five.
Most people would say that I must not choose option (ii)—just as they
would say that the judge must not choose option (ii) in Judge's Two
Options. Yet I am not a judge, and no facts about the role of a judge
in a legal system could be appealed to to explain why I must not
choose option (ii).
Indeed, Foot might have presented us at the outset, not with Judge's
Two Options and Driver's Two Options, but with Fat Man and Driver's
Two Options, and asked why I must not choose option (ii) in Fat Man,
whereas the driver may choose option (ii) in Driver's Two Options. Let us
call that Philippa Foot's problem. We might well have been tempted to
answer, as Foot would have answered, that the Letting Five Die Vs. Killing
One Principle explains why I must not choose option (ii) in Fat Man,
whereas the Killing Five Vs. Killing One Principle explains why the driver
may choose option (ii) in Driver's Two Options.
But of course that answer won't do if the Letting Five Die Vs. Killing
One Principle is false. So Philippa Foot's problem remains with us.
What is of interest is that we also have a second, different, problem
before us. As I said, most people say that the bystander may choose
option (ii) in Bystander's Two Options. In both Fat Man and Bystander's
Two Options, the agent can choose option (i), letting the five die; in both,
the agent who chooses option (ii) kills one. Why is it impermissible for
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Turning the Trolley
the agent in Fat Man to choose option (ii), but permissible for the agent
in Bystander's Two Options to choose option (ii)? Nothing we have in
hand even begins to explain this second difference.
Moreover, it is not in the least easy to see what might explain it. Since
trams are trolleys on this side of the Atlantic, I called this "the trolley
problem." (Besides, that is more euphonious than "the tram problem.")
It spawned a substantial literature. Unfortunately, nobody produced a
solution that anyone else thought satisfactory, and the trolley problem
therefore also remains with us.
ii
A few years ago, an MIT graduate student, Alexander Friedman, devoted
a chapter of his thesis to a discussion of the most interesting solutions to
the trolley problem on offer in the literature.4 He did a very good job: he
showed clearly that none of them worked. What was especially interesting, though, was what he concluded. He said: the reason why no
adequate solution has been found is that something went wrong at the
outset. He said: it just isn't true that the bystander may choose option (ii)
in Bystander's Two Options!
Friedman didn't offer an independent argument to that effect. He
drew his conclusion from two premises. First, there is the fact, which, as
I say, he showed clearly, that none of the most interesting solutions on
offer worked. We shouldn't take that fact lightly. It is, of course, …
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